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Justice As Friendship: Book Review 
 
Dr. Tan Seow Hon’s book, Justice As Friendship: A Theory of Law (Ashgate, 
2015), presents a unique and compelling argument for the proposition that 
law can be justified by extra-legal moral principles elucidated through the 
heuristic device of friendship. 
 
Overview of the book 
 
The first part of Justice As Friendship demonstrates the need for a legal 
theory that is internally coherent and that can justify the law through a set of 
extra-legal moral norms. Dr. Tan begins by highlighting the problems with 
three groups of theories of law: theories of law that claim to be purely 
descriptive, theories of law that seek to protect the autonomy of each 
individual to pursue their conception of the good life, and critical theories of 
law that suggest law is merely politics. In summary, her critique of the first 
category of theories is that they are not just descriptive but also evaluative, 
and are not morally neutral since they would uphold a morally unjust law 
deemed valid by the theories’ tests for law. The second category of theories 
implicitly apply or rely upon moral norms that their own arguments give them 
no standing to use. As to the third category, Dr. Tan contends that such 
theories lack a moral vision that can justify the law and guide its development. 
She next considers two possible means of deriving moral norms that can 
justify the law – relying upon law’s internal morality or the usage of interest-
free positions to determine what is just. However, the issue with such theories 
is that they necessarily import some form of extra-legal or substantive 
morality in the elaborations of their theories, despite the fact that these 
theories were formulated to avoid doing so.  
 
After building a case for the necessity of extra-legal moral norms by which law 
can be justified, Dr. Tan unveils her main thesis – friendship provides a model 
for deciphering the claims between the self and the other. Thus, friendship 
can be used as a heuristic device to discern the principles of justice that should 
undergird the law. The universality of friendship allows this method of 
discerning moral principles to avoid the usual controversies surrounding the 
existence and epistemology of substantive conceptions of morality.  
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The subsequent chapters flesh out this thesis. As she describes the 
phenomenon of friendship, Dr. Tan invites the reader to reflect upon one’s 
own intuition and experiences of friendship to affirm the truth of her 
propositions. She begins by elucidating some universal themes of friendship – 
it is good, other-directed, involves reciprocity, carries expectations and 
obligations, teaches us how to be better persons, and shows us the intrinsic 
worth of other people.  
 
She then defends the universality of friendship, a crucial section of her 
argument. After all, a fundamental objection that one could have to Justice As 
Friendship is whether what Dr. Tan calls the ‘law of friendship’ (p 75) exists. 
Dr. Tan identifies the forms that these objections could take and addresses 
each of them.  
 
To an argument that one’s own experiences demonstrate that there is no such 
thing as an ideal friendship, Dr. Tan responds that we can know what ideal 
friendships are like, even if our relationships are less than ideal – in fact, the 
frustrations we feel about our present relationships are clues that we have an 
intuitive perception of what an ideal friendship should be like. To an 
argument that the idea of friendship varies across time and culture, Dr. Tan 
responds that in all times and cultures, people would recognize and gravitate 
towards a relationship marked by the themes of friendship she has described. 
Any cultural variations of relationships in societies would go towards forming 
the boundaries of whom one can choose as friends, but do not vary the nature 
of the relationship that one desires. She perceptively suggests that our 
skepticism towards the idea of the universality of friendship may be due to a 
post-modern suspicion that anything can be universal. Her response is worth 
quoting in full: 
 
“We are suspicious that anything can be universal… But the suspicion 
is unwarranted when it comes to the most personal of relations – 
friendship. This is something we all know, which many of us have 
experienced, and which even the most cynical of us wish to have, but 
sometimes hold back from – not because we do not assent to the idea 
of friendship as a good and as a reciprocal relation admitting of 
obligations, but precisely because we believe in this idea but have been 
disappointed time and again by our friends, by the way reality fails to 
meet our intuitive notion of the ideal. But we cannot forget the ideal. 
We just fear being awakened by the hope of true friendship only to be 
disappointed again. And in our cynical refusal to settle for anything 
less, we implicitly continue to affirm the ideal of friendship.” (p 69) 
 
Dr. Tan observes that in the best of our friendships, we recognize and fulfil the 
legitimate expectations of our friends, love our friends as themselves, and 
enter the friendships for their own sake. She boils down the lessons that 
friendship teaches down to two broad principles – the principle of legitimate 
expectations and the principle of intrinsic worth. Through the lens of 
friendship, we can derive several principles of justice that give specificity to 
these broad principles – among others, that what is just depends on the 
particular relationship, that reciprocity is the measure of justice, and that the 
golden rule which applies in friendship should also apply to law. These norms 
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governing friendly relationships can be applied to legal relationships – both 
types of relationships exist on a continuum rather than as distinct categories, 
and both types of relationships are similar in the sense that they both attract 
rights and obligations by virtue of the manner in which the parties are 
situated, rather than by strict consent. 
 
How do these principles of justice apply to the law? Dr. Tan suggests that laws 
must conform to these principles, and that these principles justify the laws. 
Justice As Friendship can serve as a direct influence on specific laws, and also 
influence a general theory of liability undergirding an area of law. The theory 
may mandate a certain choice in some instances, or provide a range of 
possible laws that comport with the theory. A judge or law-maker may choose 
any solution within this range, utilising social facts, economic analysis and 
practical administrative considerations to make one’s decision. Applying such 
considerations is not objectionable in itself - what Justice As Friendship 
requires is a concern for people above the requirements of efficiency, a 
concern mandated by the principle of intrinsic worth. 
 
Dr. Tan supplies the reader with a plethora of examples describing how 
Justice As Friendship can be applied practically to the law. In the last two 
chapters of her book, Dr. Tan applies Justice As Friendship to contract law 
and the tort of negligence to show how the theory can both justify the law and 
guide the development of law in a principled direction. One example used to 
demonstrate how Justice As Friendship can justify the law is the doctrine of 
frustration. The doctrine of frustration allows parties to treat themselves as 
discharged from their obligations if an event beyond the control of either party 
occurs, making performance of the contract impossible or meaningless to the 
parties. Justice As Friendship justifies this doctrine through the principle of 
legitimate expectations. Applying Justice As Friendship, the legitimate 
expectations of the parties encompass not only what the parties could have 
reasonably contemplated, but also includes expectations determined by the 
golden rule. Although the parties may not have envisaged certain events 
making performance of the contract impossible or meaningless, they would 
have a legitimate expectation that the other would release them from their 
obligations should such events materialize. With regard to whether the losses 
incurred by one party at this stage should be shared or should lie where they 
fall, Justice As Friendship supports the position that both parties should share 
in the losses – the golden rule would require that there be some sharing of 
losses if they occurred through nobody’s fault. 
 
An example demonstrating how Justice As Friendship can develop the law in 
a principled direction is the duty to rescue in tort law. Presently, the law does 
not impose a positive duty to render aid to a person in danger or to prevent 
third parties from harming others, unless there are special relationships 
between the relevant parties. This position is usually justified by arguments 
that such a duty would undesirably impose on another’s freedom, or that such 
a duty is not economically efficient, among others. Justice As Friendship 
opposes the first argument by emphasizing that law is not merely based on 
respect for autonomy – love is also an important theme of law. As for the 
second argument, Justice As Friendship holds that moral arguments should 
take precedence in justifying law, not economic ones. If moral arguments 
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affirm a certain position, economic arguments against this position cannot 
invalidate it. Instead of the present legal position, the application of the 
golden rule in Justice As Friendship may require that “an alleged tortfeasor 
who comes into contact with the claimant, who is the only source of help, and 
who can help without danger to themselves or others, be required to help.” (p 
169) 
 
Evaluation 
 
As Dr. Tan herself writes, Justice As Friendship is a version of natural law 
theory, as can be seen in its reliance on extra-legal principles to justify the law. 
Its uniqueness lies in its use of friendship to reveal these extra-legal 
principles.  
 
This uniqueness is a major strength of Dr. Tan’s theory – natural law theorists 
usually face challenges proving the existence and content of the objective 
moral norms which should justify law, especially in today’s skeptical and 
liberal world. Dr. Tan’s approach deals with these problems by relying on an 
everyday phenomenon we all have some experience of. Her theory thus offers 
an accessible heuristic through which people of diverse world views can form 
a consensus on principles of morality such as the golden rule and the principle 
of intrinsic worth, principles which were long thought of as universal but are 
no longer taken for granted today.  
 
Another advantage of Dr. Tan’s theory is that it relies on a universal 
phenomenon that does not depend on a particular background conception of 
society to be understood. In contrast, some aspects of Dworkin’s theory, as 
described in Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978) would 
not be intuitive to someone not living in a liberal democracy. The priority of 
rights over goals, as defined in his theory, is drawn from a background 
conception of a liberal democracy, and may not be intuitive to someone living 
in a Marxist society, for example. The appeal of Dr. Tan’s theory stretches 
across political and cultural boundaries, acknowledging the existence of 
diverse world views and also unifying them in a substantive and meaningful 
consensus. 
 
That is not to say that there will be no detractors of Justice As Friendship. As 
mentioned above, Justice As Friendship hinges on the claim that the norms of 
friendship as described in the book are universal. However, a detractor who 
believes that friendship is a purely self-serving tool to boost one’s ego, among 
other things, may find Dr. Tan’s appeal to intuition and experiences to affirm 
the universality of friendship’s themes unconvincing. To such a detractor, Dr. 
Tan could respond that his conception of friendship is warped and is an 
example of an abuse of the ideal of friendship, rather than proof that the ideal 
of friendship she describes does not exist.  
 
In addition, although Justice As Friendship does not begin from a particular 
vision of human nature, through its use of the heuristic device of friendship, it 
does arrive at a certain vision, i.e. that humans are relational creatures who 
have intrinsic worth. Detractors who disagree with this vision of human 
nature are likely to disagree with the heuristic proposed by Justice As 
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Friendship as well. For such detractors, Justice As Friendship challenges their 
view of human nature by calling them to reflect upon their actual experiences 
of friendship. Justice As Friendship suggests that even if we outwardly hold to 
the view that human nature is self-interested or that humans have no intrinsic 
worth aside from their utility, our intuitive perceptions of how we should treat 
our friends and how we would like to be treated implicitly affirm an ideal of 
friendship that contradicts our outwardly-held view. Detractors may choose to 
explain their desires for deeper and more meaningful friendships as mere 
personal preferences, or reject the idea that they do indeed have such desires. 
In any case, at the very least, Justice As Friendship should trigger readers to 
reflect deeply on their most closely-held views.  
 
Dr. Tan anticipates that a detractor may argue that her theory’s inability to 
provide mathematical certainty in adjudication detracts from the usefulness of 
her theory. Her response is that Justice As Friendship’s chief value is in 
providing a consistent bedrock of principle upon which laws can be justified 
and to which laws should conform. She also suggests that the fact that Justice 
As Friendship is not algorithmic may simply mean that our fixation on finding 
clean and neat answers to all questions of law and justice is misguided. A 
detractor may press the issue by accepting that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
for any theory to provide mathematical certainty in adjudication, but arguing 
that what a theory must provide is a degree of objectivity in adjudication for 
the sake of certainty in decisions, and that Justice As Friendship does not 
prevent judges from applying their own whims, fancies, and preferences in 
friendship to derive the principles guiding adjudication. To such a detractor, 
Dr. Tan could respond that judges are not free to impose their own whims, 
fancies, and preferences because they are constrained by the methodology of 
friendship, which yields moral principles that people can form an inter-
subjective consensus on.  
 
Aside from its contribution to legal academia, Dr. Tan’s theory is also of 
practical import for judges, lawyers, and lawmakers. This fact is amply 
demonstrated by the beefy sections on tort and contract law at the end of the 
book, which describe the practical impact of Justice As Friendship on areas of 
law ranging from when a duty of care exists in tort law to the doctrine of 
implied terms in contract law. 
 
In conclusion, Justice As Friendship’s ability to form a substantive consensus 
on moral norms despite the diversity of world views in today’s pluralistic 
world is a major contribution to legal philosophy. Beyond that, Justice As 
Friendship propels the law towards a vision of society characterised by 
relationships of selflessness, reciprocity, and love – an ideal that many of us 
have grown cynical of or have given up entirely, but indeed, an ideal we should 
not forget. 
  
  
Chng Wei Yao Kenny 
(Singapore Management University) 
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* This blog entry may be cited as Chng Wei Yao Kenny, “Justice As Friendship: Book 
Review”, Singapore Law Blog (21 September 2015) 
(http://www.singaporelawblog.sg/blog/article/136) 
